I am a Monetary Advisor at the Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, the Anne O. Krueger Professor of Economics and a Distinguished McKnight University Professor at the University of Minnesota. My areas of interest are macroeconomic theory and international economics. I am currently an editor at the Journal of Economic Theory. I completed my PhD at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.

contactme@amador.email

Code

• Github repositories, includes code and data used in published papers, as well as other things.

Book

• The Economics of Sovereign Debt and Default

  Aguiar, Mark, and Manuel Amador (2021). The Economics of Sovereign Debt and Default. Princeton University Press.

  Code

Working papers

• Tariff Wars and Net Foreign Asset Positions

  Aguiar, Mark, Manuel Amador, and Doireann Fitzgerald (2025): “Tariff Wars and Net Foreign Asset Positions”.

• Helicopter Drops and Liquidity Traps

  Amador, Manuel, and Javier Bianchi (2025): “Helicopter Drops and Liquidity Traps”.

• Central Bank Reputation with Noise

  Amador, Manuel, and Christopher Phelan (2024): “Central Bank Reputation with Noise”.

• Bank-runs, Fragility, and Regulation

  Amador, Manuel, and Javier Bianchi (2025): “Bank-runs, Fragility, and Regulation”.

• Pareto Improving Fiscal and Monetary Policies: Samuelson in the New Keynesian Model

  Aguiar, Mark, Manuel Amador, and Cristina Arellano (2024): “Pareto Improving Fiscal and Monetary Policies: Samuelson in the New Keynesian Model”.

• Delegation Theory and the Delegation of Tariff-Negotiation Authority

  Amador, Manuel, and Kyle Bagwell (2019): “Delegation Theory and the Delegation of Tariff-Negotiation Authority”.

• Foreign Reserve Management at Zero Interest Rates (slides)

  Amador, Manuel, Javier Bianchi, Luigi Bocola, and Fabrizio Perri (2019): “Foreign Reserve Management at Zero Interest Rates”.

• Crisis and Commitment: Inflation Credibility and the Vulnerability to Sovereign Debt Crises

  Aguiar, Mark, Manuel Amador, Gita Gopinath, and Emmanuel Farhi (2013): “Crisis and Commitment: Inflation Credibility and the Vulnerability to Sovereign Debt Crises”.

• Sovereign Debt and the Tragedy of the Commons

  Amador, Manuel (2012): “Sovereign Debt and the Tragedy of the Commons”.

  Previous version: “A Political Economy Model of Sovereign Debt Repayment”

Publications

BibTeX file

• Micro Risks and (Robust) Pareto Improving Policies

  Aguiar, Mark, Manuel Amador, and Cristina Arellano (2024): “Micro Risks and (Robust) Pareto Improving Policies”. American Economic Review, 114 (11): 3669–3713.

  PDF – Journal link – Online appendix – Code – BibTeX and abstract

• Bank-runs, Fragility, and Credit Easing

  Amador, Manuel, and Javier Bianchi (2024): “Bank-runs, Fragility, and Credit Easing”, American Economic Review, 114 (7): 2073-2110.

  PDF – Journal link – Previous results in “Partial Bank Runs and Optimal Default” – BibTeX and abstract

• Sovereign-Debt Crises and Floating-Rate Bonds

  Aguiar, Mark, Manuel Amador, and Ricardo Alves Monteiro (2023): “Sovereign-Debt Crises and Floating-Rate Bonds”, In A. Aguirre, A. Fernandez, and S. Kalemli-Ozcan, editors, Credibility of Emerging Markets, Foreign Investors’ Risk Perceptions and Capital Flows, pages 159–84.

  PDF – Journal link – Slides – BibTeX and abstract

• Reputation and Partial Default

  Amador, Manuel, and Christopher Phelan (2023): “Reputation and Partial Default”, AER:Insights, 5(2): 158-172.

  PDF – Journal link – Code – BibTeX and abstract

• Regulating a Monopolist with Uncertain Costs without Transfers

  Amador, Manuel, and Kyle Bagwell (2022): “Regulating a Monopolist with Uncertain Costs without Transfers”, Theoretical Economics, 17 (4): 1719-1760.

  PDF – Journal link – BibTeX and abstract

• Reputation and Sovereign Default

  Amador, Manuel, and Christopher Phelan (2021): “Reputation and Sovereign Default”. Econometrica, 89 (4): 1979-2010.

  PDF – Journal link – Online appendix – Code – BibTeX and abstract

• Self-fulfilling Debt Dilution: Maturity and Multiplicity in Debt Models

  Aguiar, Mark, and Manuel Amador (2020): “Self-fulfilling Debt Dilution: Maturity and Multiplicity in Debt Models”. American Economic Review, 110 (9): 2783-2818.

  PDF – Journal link – Online appendix – Code for Numerical Simulations – Code for Figures – Additional code – BibTeX and abstract

• Exchange Rate Policies at the Zero Lower Bound

  Amador, Manuel, Javier Bianchi, Luigi Bocola, and Fabrizio Perri (2020): “Exchange Rate Policies at the Zero Lower Bound”. Review of Economic Studies, 87(4): 1605-1645.

  PDF – Journal link – Older Working Paper – BibTeX and abstract

• Money Burning in the Theory of Delegation

  Amador, Manuel, and Kyle Bagwell (2020): “Money burning in the theory of delegation,” Games and Economic Behavior, 112: 382-412.

  PDF – Journal link – BibTeX and abstract

• On the Welfare Losses from External Sovereign Borrowing

  Aguiar, Mark, Manuel Amador, and Stelios Fourakis (2020): “On the Welfare Losses from External Sovereign Borrowing,” IMF Economic Review, 68(1): 163-194.

  PDF – Journal link – Slides – Code – BibTeX and abstract

• A Contraction for Sovereign Debt Models

  Aguiar, Mark, and Manuel Amador (2019): “A Contraction for Sovereign Debt Models,” Journal of Economic Theory, 183: 842-875.

  PDF – Journal link – BibTeX and abstract

• Take the Short Route: Equilibrium Default and Debt Maturity

  Aguiar, Mark, Manuel Amador, Hugo Hopenhayn, and Ivan Werning (2019): “Take the Short Route: Equilibrium Default and Debt Maturity,” Econometrica, 87(2): 423-462.

  PDF – Journal link – NBER Working Paper – Slides – BibTeX and abstract

• A Note on Interval Delegation

  Amador, Manuel, Kyle Bagwell, and Alex Frankel (2018): “A Note on Interval Delegation,” Economic Theory Bulletin, 6(2): 239-249.

  PDF – Journal link – Online appendix – BibTeX and abstract

• Reverse Speculative Attacks

  Amador, Manuel, Javier Bianchi, Luigi Bocola, and Fabrizio Perri (2016): “Reverse Speculative Attacks,” Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, 72: 125–137.

  PDF – Journal link – Code – BibTeX and abstract

• Fiscal Policy in Debt Constrained Economies

  Aguiar, Mark, and Manuel Amador (2016): “Fiscal Policy in Debt Constrained Economies,” Journal of Economic Theory, 161: 37-75.

  PDF – Journal link – Code – BibTeX and abstract

• Coordination and Crisis in Monetary Unions

  Aguiar, Mark, Manuel Amador, Emmanuel Farhi, and Gita Gopinath (2015): “Coordination and Crisis in Monetary Unions,” The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 130(4): 1727-1779.

  PDF – Journal link – BibTeX and abstract

• Sovereign Debt Booms in Monetary Unions

  Aguiar, Mark, Manuel Amador, Emmanuel Farhi and Gita Gopinath (2014): “Sovereign Debt Booms in Monetary Unions,” American Economic Review: Papers and Proceedings, 104(5).

  PDF – Journal link – Code – BibTeX and abstract

• Sovereign Debt

  Aguiar, Mark, and Manuel Amador (2014): ”Sovereign Debt,” Handbook of International Economics, Vol 4, North-Holland: 647-87.

  PDF – Journal link – BibTeX and abstract

• The Theory of Optimal Delegation with An Application to Tariff Caps

  Amador, Manuel, and Kyle Bagwell (2013): “The Theory of Optimal Delegation with an Application to Tariff Caps,” Econometrica, 81(4): 1541-1599.

  PDF – Journal link – Online Appendix – BibTeX and abstract

• Tariff Revenue and Tariff Caps

  Amador, Manuel, and Kyle Bagwell (2012): “Tariff Revenue and Tariff Caps,” American Economic Review: Papers and Proceedings, 102(3): 459–465.

  PDF – Journal link – BibTeX and abstract

• Learning from Private and Public Observations of Others’ Actions

  Amador, Manuel, and Pierre-Olivier Weill (2012): “Learning from Private and Public Observations of Others’ Actions,” Journal of Economic Theory, 147(3): 910-940.

  PDF – Journal link – Online Appendix – Older Working Paper – BibTeX and abstract

• Growth in the Shadow of Expropriation

  Aguiar, Mark, and Manuel Amador (2011): “Growth in the Shadow of Expropriation,” The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 126(2): 651-697.

  PDF – Journal link – Online Appendix – Complete version (with appendix) – Code – BibTeX and abstract

• Learning from Prices, Public Communication and Welfare

  Amador, Manuel, and Pierre-Olivier Weill (2010): “Learning from Prices: Public Communication and Welfare,” Journal of Political Economy, 118(5): 866-907.

  PDF – Journal link – Online Appendix – BibTeX and abstract

• Expropriation Dynamics

  Aguiar, Mark, Manuel Amador, and Gita Gopinath (2009): “Expropriation Dynamics,” American Economic Review: Papers and Proceedings, 99(2): 473-479.

  PDF – Journal link – Code – BibTeX and abstract

• Investment Cycles and Sovereign Debt Overhang

  Aguiar, Mark, Manuel Amador, and Gita Gopinath (2009): “Investment Cycles and Sovereign Debt Overhang,” Review of Economic Studies, 76(1): 1-31.

  PDF – Journal link – BibTeX and abstract

• Commitment vs Flexibility

  Amador, Manuel, Ivan Werning, and George‐Marios Angeletos (2006): “Commitment vs. Flexibility,” Econometrica, 74(2): 365-396.

  PDF – Journal link – Online Appendix – NBER Working Paper – BibTeX and abstract